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The Effects of Derecognition of
Taiwan on United States Corporate
Interests
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 15, 1978, President Jimmy Carter announced that
the United States would normalize diplomatic relations with the
Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) and that present diplomatic rela-
tions with the government of the Republic of China (Taiwan) would
cease as of January 1, 1979.' The establishment of diplomatic re-
lations with the PRC was the culmination of a series of objectives set
out by President Richard Nixon under the Shanghai Communiqu6 in
1972.2
President Carter's announcement aroused controversy in the
United States Congress3 and in the Taiwan government. The people
and government of Taiwan, as well as American businesspersons,
were alarmed at this sudden announcement to sever diplomatic re-
lations with Taiwan. Among the many questions regarding the de-
cision, American businesspersons expressed concern with the poten-
tial adverse effects on their investments in Taiwan and the protection
of these interests by the U.S. and Taiwan governments.
This note will examine the extent to which American investments
in Taiwan have been adversely affected by the change in Taiwan's
diplomatic status and review the legal barriers to continuing business
relations presented by future "unofficial" 4 relations between the United
1. Address by President Carter to the Nation, 14 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2264
(Dec. 15, 1978), reprinted in Implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act: Issues and
Concerns: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Comm.
on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1977) [hereinafter cited as TRA Issues, Feb.
1979].
2. 66 DEP'T ST. BULL. 435 (1972)[hereinafter cited as Shanghai Communiqu6].
3. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (Senator Barry Goldwater and other
Congressmen sued to enjoin President Carter from abrogating the mutual defense treaty with
Taiwan without Senate approval). Although the timing of the announcement was a surprise,
it must be emphasized that the United States and the PRC had been engaged in the gradual
process of normalizing relations since the Shanghai Communique, a period of eight
years. Nevertheless, members of Congress were still angered by the President's unilateral
decision to simultaneously terminate diplomatic relations with Taiwan and to abrogate the
Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954.
4. TRA Issues, Feb. 1979, supra note 1, at 134. The President stated: "In the future,
the American people and the people of Taiwan will maintain commercial, cultural, and other
relations without official government representation and without diplomatic relations."
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States and Taiwan. Additionally, this note will examine the role of
the American Institute in Taiwan as established under the Taiwan
Relations Act and assess its past performance and predict its future
effectiveness. Finally, this note will analyze the economic, political
and strategic concerns brought on by derecognition, in order to provide
helpful background for potential American investors. Questions which
will be considered include: whether derecognition means that existing
treaties and agreements affecting commercial relations will not be
protected under U.S. law; what is the status of Taiwan under inter-
national law; and whether there are remedies for contract disputes
which may arise between American and Taiwanese nationals.
. II. BACKGROUND OF THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT
When President Carter established diplomatic relations with the
PRC, he met the PRC's preconditions to normalization of relations
enumerated in the Shanghai Communiqu6?. These preconditions were
the severance of diplomatic relations with the government of Taiwan,
the removal of all United States military personnel and installations
from Taiwan, and the abrogation of the U.S.-Republic of China Mu-
tual Defense Treaty of 1954.6
The PRC insisted in the Shanghai Communiqu6 that the United
States acknowledge that there is only one China and that Taiwan is
but a part of China.7 The United States' acknowledgement altered a
long-standing position which had recognized the government of Tai-
wan as the de jure government of China. 8 With the establishment of
diplomatic relations with the PRC, the United States recognized the
PRC government on the mainland as de jure while the government
on Taiwan as only a de facto political entity.
However, Taiwan continues to be recognized under international
law, having satisfied the requirements necessary to acquire interna-
tional legal protections. 9 Under international law, the existence of a
governmental entity or state is separate from recognition of that
5. Comment, The Law of Treaty Termination as Applied to the United States De-
Recognition of the Republic of China, 19 HARV. INTL L.J. 931 n.3 (1978).
6. Id. at 931-33.
7. The President stated: "The Government of the United States of America acknowl-
edges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China." TRA
Issues, Feb. 1979, supra note 1. at 133.
8. V.H. Li. DE-RECOGNIZING TAIWAN: THE LEGAL PROBLEMS 9-10 (1977).
9. Sheikh, The United States and Taiwan After DeRecognition: Consequences and
Legal Remedies, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 323. 324-25 (1980).
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government by a foreign country. 0 A state must meet specific re-
quirements for it to retain a legal identity under international law. The
state must have (1) a government which is in "effective control" of
its defined territory; (2) the "bulk of its inhabitants possess sufficient
political stability and provide allegiance to whatever national symbols
there might be;" (3) leadership which possesses "sufficient admin-
istrative capability to carry out . . . internal government functions
and its international obligations under international law and the United
Nations Charter;" and (4) no "massive and systematic interference
in its domestic affairs by a foreign power."II
Because Taiwan has satisfied these requirements, the PRC has
not insisted that all existing treaties and agreements between the United
States and Taiwan be terminated. In fact, as Senator Edward Kennedy
noted, the PRC no longer feels compelled to object to official U.S.
relations with Taiwan. 2 Rather, the PRC has agreed to permit the
United States and Taiwan to continue relations on an unofficial basis. 11
Diplomatic recognition. of a country by other countries in the
international community is usually based on the pursuit of mutual
benefits or on the existence of common interests.14 A country might
subsequently withdraw its recognition if antagonistic relations devel-
oped or if there were a change in its national interests. 15 Historically,
American withdrawal of de jure recognition of a foreign government
has been the result of either unfriendly relations or for political rea-
sons.16 For example, the PRC was recognized as a state under in-
ternational law but the United States did not grant it de jure recogni-
tion until 1978. This was not the case with the derecognition of
Taiwan. The withdrawal of the United States' de jure recognition of
Taiwan merely dismissed Taiwan's claim to be the sole government
10. Id. at 324.
i1. Id. at 325; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES §100 (1965), which states:
Before recognizing an entity as a new state, the recognizing state is required to
make a determination, reasonably based upon fact, that the entity:
(a) has a defined territory and population;
(b) is under the control of a regime that satisfies the minimum requirements for
recognition as a government under No. 101;
(c) has the capacity to engage in foreign relations; and
(d) shows reasonable indications that the requirements of Clauses (a)-(c) will
continue to be satisfied.
12. TRA Issues. Feb. 1979, supra note I, at 3.
13. Id.
1.4. Sheikh, supra note 9, at 325.
15. Id.
16. LI. supra note 8, at 18.
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of China. ' 7
With regard to diplomatic recognition, United States relations
with the PRC and Taiwan present an interesting and unique situa-
tion. The United States severed de jure diplomatic relations with
Taiwan to establish normal de jure relations with the PRC. This was
accomplished for practical as well as political reasons. Nonetheless,
the severing of de jure diplomatic relations with Taiwan does not
adversely affect U.S. dealings with Taiwan nor does it contravene
the basic premises of international law. Professor Victor H. Li states
that "there is no general or categorical statutory provision which
prohibits or limits dealings with countries not recognized de jure by
the United States."1
8
After withdrawal of de jure recognition, President Carter pro-
vided the opportunity to recognize Taiwan as a separate political entity
and to establish de facto recognition of Taiwan. 19 In essence, it was
suggested that all previous relationships with Taiwan continue on an
unofficial basis. Since Congress permits dealings with de facto rec-
ognized countries, Congress could construct a new legal framework
which would allow the maintenance of relations with Taiwan in the
context of normalization of relations with the PRC. 20 All agreements
between the United States and Taiwan would have binding legal effect
despite the recognition of Taiwan as a de facto instead of a de jure
political entity. 21 Thus, treaties would not lapse upon the withdrawal
of de jure recognition or upon the transfer of recognition from one
government to the other.2 2 "[The] United States-ROC treaties may
17. TRA Issues, Feb. 1979, supra note 1, at 22 (Statement of the Honorable Richard
Holbrooke. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs).
18. Li, supra note 8, at 14.
19. The President stated:
[11n the future, the American people and the people of Taiwan will maintain
commercial, cultural, and other relations without official diplomatic relations. The
Administration will seek adjustments to our laws and regulations to permit the
maintenance of commercial, cultural and other non-governmental relationships in
the new circumstances that will exist after normalization.
TRA Issues, Feb. 1979, supra note 1, at 134.
20. Li, supra note 8, at 18-19.
21. Id. at 15-16. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 161 & 4 (1965). The latter section states: "Except as otherwise
indicated, 'state,' as used in the Restatement of this Subject, means an entity that has a
defined territory and population under the control of a government and that engages in foreign
relations."
22. Comment, supra note 5, at 962-63. Mr. Scheffer points out that "there is no
principle of international law which would require that those treaties must lapse upon sev-
erance of diplomatic relations or transfer of recognition from one government to the other." Id.
166 [Vol. 6:163
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then be regarded as remaining in force between the de facto govern-
ment in Taipei and the United States government." 2 3 Taiwan may
continue to enter into binding international agreements without fear
that the PRC would secede to all of the former's treaties and obli-
gations. 24 Based on United States treatment of de facto and de jure
relations with other countries in the past as well as on principles of
international law, no significant change in Taiwan's status or in U.S.-
Taiwan relations is likely to result from derecognition. 25
Since normalization of relations between the PRC and the United
States has been concluded, there is no longer political uncertainty
regarding Taiwan's possible annexation by the PRC. 26 While the
Taiwanese may favor normalization, they do not necessarily favor
unification. 27 In fact, the people of Taiwan believe that there may
be peaceful coexistence with the PRC since the choice between their
government and that of the PRC is unrealistic. 28 This would negate
any immediate PRC threat to take over Taiwan. 29
The Taiwanese are directing their energies toward maintaining
their economic viability in East Asia. The Taiwan Relations Act is
one of the principle instruments through which this can be accom-
plished. The Act provided a smooth transition for the U.S. from
withdrawal of de jure recognition to the establishment of unofficial
de facto relations with Taiwan.
III. THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT
Many American businesspersons were concerned that their in-
terests with Taiwan would be taken over by the PRC. They believed
that the PRC might claim a right to all property and interests on
Taiwan. There was uncertainty whether existing contracts entered
into with citizens and the government of Taiwan would remain valid
after the United States withdrawal of de jure recognition.30 President
23. Id. at 963.
24. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 100 & 108 (1965).
25. See generally Sheikh, supra note 9, at 324.
26. See, The U.S. rebuff fails to dampen the boom, Bus. WK., Oct. 8, 1979, 47, 51.
27. TRA Issues, Feb. 1979, supra note 1, at 73.
28. Id. at 74.
29. Id. Mr. Ming-Min Peng, Director of the Taiwanese-American Society and Di-
rector of Formosan Studies, testified that the majority of Taiwanese were in favor of the
normalization.
30. Id. at 80-81 (statement of Robert Parker, President of the American Chamber of
Commerce in the Republic of China representing American business interests).
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Carter stated that we are "recognizing simple reality" by recognizing
the PRC as "the single Government of China." This statement cre-
ated anxieties and confusion over the legal framework under which
American businesses would operate in Taiwan.31 Ambrican business
interests and concerns were closely interrelated with Taiwan's military
security. Business interests depended upon economic and political
stability within the Taiwanese system of government and among the
people of Taiwan. In order to adequately ensure stability, there had
to be an assurance of military security from potential threats by the
PRC. A major concern was the fact that the PRC could initiate a
blockade of Taiwan's air and sea trade lanes, thereby jeopardizing its
primary economic strength: in the import/export markets.
32
Some American companies refused to conduct business with
Taiwan because of (1) the uncertainty over adequate protection of
their interests and investments in Taiwan, and (2) the PRC's refusal
to conduct business with those companies which operated in Tai-
wan. For example, American Express ceased doing business with
Taiwan when the PRC refused to honor its traveller's cheques because
of American Express' operations in Taiwan. 33 The American business
community in Taiwan called upon Congress to provide safeguards to
protect their interests from PRC economic coercion and to protect
U.S. credit, over $2 billion, to borrowers in Taiwan.3 4 Specifically,
the American business community demanded assurance that all rel-
evant treaties and agreements, if transformed into private contracts
between two non-governmental entities, would continue to have full
force and effect of law in either country. 35 Furthermore, the business
community insisted that the President consult Congress or the gov-
ernment in Taiwan before any additional international treaties and
agreements between the United States and Taiwan were terminated. 36
It is important to note some of the primary concerns of American
businesspersons with respect to the investments they sought to pro-
31. Id. at 81.
32. Id. at 78. Such a blockade may be an alternative to the PRC's present inability
to launch an effective amphibious assault while avoiding direct military conflict with fellow
Chinese.
33. Id. at 79.
34. Mr. Parker remarked to the Committee that banks are "ultra sensitive to political
and economic adjustments, and the imposition by Peking of economic sanctions against
Taiwan could easily trigger an immediate credit freeze" thereby jeopardizing huge American
investments. Id.




tect. This may provide guidance for the potential American inves-
tor. The primary issues that concerned the American businesspersons
were:
(1) Whether the PRC would have jurisdiction over Taiwan as the
sole government of all of China, to claim all existing contracts
made between the U.S. and Taiwan and all rights to property in
Taiwan;
(2) Whether American courts would provide a sufficient forum
for the settlement of claims and disputes between American and
Taiwanese firms;
(3) Whether the government of Taiwan would have the capacity
to sue and be sued in American courts in the event of default of
payments .
7
With these concerns in mind, Congress enacted legislation to
keep current relations unimpaired between the U.S. and Taiwan,
despite the change from official to unofficial recognition. On April
10, 1979, Congress adopted the Taiwan Relations Act, which Pres-
ident Carter signed into law.38 The purpose of this Act was to "help
maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific and to
promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the
continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the
people of the United States and the people on Taiwan." 39 The Act
provided that relations between the United States and Taiwan would
remain virtually unchanged.
. The introduction to the Taiwan Relations Act states that before
any commercial, cultural and other relations can continue, Taiwan's
military security has to be ensured. 4° The Act removed previous
uncertainties concerning the security of Taiwan's socio-economic sys-
tem. Furthermore, the PRC acknowledged United States' interests
in maintaining peace and stability in East Asia and assured the U.S.
37. Id. at 82-83. Mr. Parker also noted that it was essential that the United States
recognize Taiwan as a sovereign so that commercial and financial relations between the two
countries could continue smoothly. The United States could continue such relations with
Taiwan and still respect all the attributes of sovereignty with respect to territory within
Taiwan's control, as required under international law. See Sheikh, supra note 9, at 327.
38. The Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-8. 93 Stat. 14 (1979)(codified at 22
U.S.C. §§ 3301-3316 (Supp. V 1981)). The President also issued Executive Order No.
12,143 two months after the passage of the Act, signifying his sincere intent to have relations
between the U.S. and Taiwan continue without interruption and without significant
change. TRA Issues, Feb. 1979, supra note I, at 140.
39. 22 U.S.C. § 3301(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
40. TRA Issues, Feb. 1979, supra note I, at 134, 140.
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that it would not annex Taiwan by the use of military force. 41
With regard to the possibility of PRC abrogation of contracts
made between the United States and Taiwan, it has been argued that
debts and other contractual obligations between citizens and govern-
ments of the United States and Taiwan would not be adequately
protected and enforced. 42 Mr. Robert Parker of the American Cham-
ber of Commerce in Taiwan concluded before the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs that the Carter Administration's attempts to "se-
lectively transfer" some of the treaties and agreements into "unofficial
status" would render them invalid in direct contravention of Congres-
sional intent.
43
The Taiwan Relations Act removed doubts concerning the future
of agreements, treaties and contracts entered into between American
and Taiwanese firms. Section 4(a) of the Act provides that:
The absence of diplomatic relations or recognition shall not affect
the application of the laws of the United States with respect to
Taiwan, and the laws of the United States shall apply with respect
to Taiwan in the manner that the laws of the United States applied
with respect to Taiwan prior to January 1, 1979."
Section 4(a) also states that the President or any agency of the
United States government is authorized to perform services through
contracts with commercial entities on Taiwan in accordance with applica-
ble United States law despite the absence of official diplomatic
relations. 45 In addition, the United States recognizes the validity of
Taiwan law whenever application of United States law depends on
it. 46 Although the Mutual Defense Treaty of 195447 was abrogated
by the Taiwan Relations Act, this Act has maintained the intent of
the former treaty. 48 Furthermore, section 4(b)(3)(B) states that:
41. Sheikh, supra note 9, at 330.
42. Id. at 337.
43. Implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act: Hearings Before the House Comm.
on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., I st Sess. 11 (1979)[hereinafter cited as TRA Hearings, Oct.
& Nov. 1979].
44. The Taiwan Relations Act § 4(a), 22 U.S.C. § 3303(a).
45. Id. § 4(b)(2)-4(b)(3)(A), 22 U.S.C. § 3303(b)(2)-3303(b)(3)(A).
46. Id.
47. Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954, Mar. 3, 1955, United States-Republic of China,
art. V, 6 U.S.T. 433, 436, T.I.A.S. No. 3178. The treaty between the United States and
Taiwan pledges the two nations to mutual defense of Taiwan for the purpose of deterring
aggressors and resisting communist subversion. Each party would.act to meet the common
danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.
48. The Taiwan Relations Act § 4(a)(8)(C), 22 U.S.C. § 3303 (Supp. V 1981).
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For all purposes under the laws of the United States, including
actions in any court in the United States, recognition of the
Peoples' Republic of China shall not affect in any way the own-
ership of or other rights or interests in properties, tangible and
intangible, and other things of value, owned or held on or prior
to December 31, 1978, or thereafter acquired or earned by the
governing authorities on Taiwan.
49
United States law has properly acknowledged that Taiwan is a
separate legal and political entity with effective control over a spe-
cifically defined territory, and is protected from any legal or juris-
dictional claims by the PRC. 5° The Taiwan Relations Act and prin-
ciples of international law recognize that the PRC government is not
now, and never has been, the government in control of Taiwan. The
Taiwan Relations Act is based on the premise that for domestic pur-
poses Taiwan is subject to specific legal treatment without reference
to the PRC. 51 Taiwan may continue to autonomously manage its
socio-economic affairs.
The Taiwan Relations Act also addressed the concern of pro-
viding a sufficient forum for the settlement of claims. Section 4(b)(7)
of the Act states that "[t]he capacity of Taiwan to sue and be sued
in courts in the United States, in accordance with the laws of the
United States, shall not be abrogated, infringed, modified, denied,
or otherwise affected in any way by the absence of diplomatic relations
or recognition." ' 52 Taiwanese and American claim settlements in
American courts would have absolutely no affect on U.S.-PRC
relations.
An example of the principle that a foreign government, although
not recognized by the executive or legislative branch of the United
States government, may nevertheless have de facto existence which
is juridically cognizable, is found in the case of Upright v. Mercury
Business Machines Company.53 In Upright, the plaintiff, an individ-
ual, was the assignee of a trade acceptance drawn and accepted by
the defendant, Mercury Business Machines, in payment for business
typewriters sold to it. Plaintiff's assignor was organized by and
was an arm and instrumentality of the East German government 5 4 a
49. Id. § 4(b)(3)(B), 22 U.S.C. § 3303(b)(3)(B).
50. TRA Issues, Feb. 1979, supra note 1, at 117.
51. The Taiwan Relations Act § 4(a), 22 U.S.C. § 3303(a) (Supp. V 1981).
52. Id. § 4(b)(7), 22 U.S.C. § 3303(b)(7).
53. 13 A.D.2d 36. 213 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1961).
54. Id. at 41, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
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government not recognized by the American government.5 The de-
fendant argued that the lack of de jure recognition of the East German
government was determinative of whether transactions with it should
be denied enforcement in U.S. courts.56 The court rejected this ar-
gument and held that "[tihe lack of jural status for [an unrecognized]
government or its creature corporation is not determinative of whether
transactions with it will be denied enforcement in American courts
.. . .- When considering United States policy in foreign affairs,
[t]he legal consequences of non-recognition should be narrowly con-
strued unless they can be properly related as inimical to the aims and
purposes of our public and national policy."58 The Taiwan Relations
Act, by encouraging the continuation of economic, cultural and other
relations, reflects the American policy of assuring the continued pros-
perity of Taiwan.59 In light of this policy, private parties in Taiwan
have standing to sue in American courts. 60
IV. THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN
To enable U.S.-Taiwan relations to continue unofficially, the
Taiwan Relations Act also provides for the establishment of the Amer-
ican Institute in Taiwan (AIT). Section 6(a)(1) of the Taiwan Re-
lations Act states:
Programs, transactions, and other relations conducted or carried
out by the President or any agency of the United States Government
with respect to Taiwan shall, in the manner and to the extent
directed by the President, be conducted and carried out by or
through
(1) The American Institute in Taiwan, a non-profit corporation
incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia ..... 61
55. Id. at 41, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
56. id. at 42. 213 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
57. Id. However, the court concluded that the mere fact that a country is unrecognized
de jure may be determinative if the unrecognized government is the plaintiff. Id. "[Ilf the
unrecognized government were allowed to sue, this would be deemed recognition of jural
status (Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E.
259 119231)." Id. at 42 n.2, 213 N.Y.S. 2d at 421 n.2.
58. TRA Issues, Feb. 1979, supra note 1, at 120.
59. Id.
60. See Daniunas v. Simutis, 481 F. Supp. 132, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)(recognition is
to be given to private, as opposed to political acts, of any unrecognized sovereign).
61. The Taiwan Relations Act § 6(a)(1), 22 U.S.C. § 3305(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
172 [Vol. 6:163
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In essence, the AIT succeeds the U.S. Embassy in Taiwan, with
certain limitations discussed below.
62
The establishment of the AIT presents a unique situation under
traditional diplomatic practice. The AIT is a private non-profit cor-
poration specifically created to carry out the provisions of the Taiwan
Relations Act. 63 The AIT consists of a three-person board of trustees
with particular expertise in U.S.-Taiwan relations and with privileges
and immunities normally accorded ordinary diplomatic personnel.
64
The AIT entered into a contract with the State Department to
provide certain services in return for reimbursement of operating costs
within prescribed limits. 6  The AIT's principal commercial goals are
to provide an "increase [in] sales of American goods and services to
Taiwan, to enlarge the U.S. share of the Taiwan market, to provide
information and services to U.S. firms interested in trading with and
investing in Taiwan, and to encourage the removal by Taiwan of
restrictions which discourage imports from the United States. "66
In addition, the AIT may present technical problems to the State
Department that it is unable to address directly. 67 For example, be-
cause the AIT is the agency through which the United States conducts
its unofficial relations with Taiwan, it may obtain technical infor-
mation from any agency of the U.S. government necessary to conduct
such relations. 6 Section 7 of the Taiwan Relations Act authorizes
the employees of the AIT to perform the functions and services of
United States consular officers. 69 Thus, all transactions and com-
munications of a governmental nature are directed through the AIT
rather than through U.S. government agencies. 70 This has permitted
62. TRA Hearings, Oct. & Nov. 1979, supra note 43, at 12 (statement of Robert
Parker, President, American Chamber of Commerce in the Republic of China).
63. Id.
64. Id. See also The Taiwan Relations Act § 10(c), 22 U.S.C. § 3309 (Supp. V
1981).
65. Oversight of the Taiwan Relations Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on East
Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
9-12 (1980)[hereinafter cited as Oversight](statement of David Dean, Chairman of the Board
and Managing Director, American Institute in Taiwan).
66. Id. at 10.
67. TRA Hearings, Oct. & Nov. 1979, supra note 43, at 34 (statement of Honorable
Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State).
68. Id.
69. The Taiwan Relations Act § 7, 22 U.S.C. § 3306 (Supp. V 1981).
70. Randolph, The Status of Agreements Between the American Institute in Taiwan
and the Coordination Council for North American Affairs, 15 lrr'L LAW. 249, 252 (1981).
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a smooth transition into the new relationship with Taiwan.
In representing the interests of the United States, the AIT over-
sees the performance of existing treaties and agreements and negotiates
agreements with Taiwan's counterpart, the Coordination Council for
North American Affairs (CCNAA).7' Since the AIT and CCNAA
represent the interests of their respective governments, both the United
States and Taiwan accept the legal consequences and benefits of their
agreements. 72 The United States and Taiwan may modify these agree-
ments on a case-by-case basis. 73
Because of the unofficial status of U.S.-Taiwan relations, the
AIT does not enjoy the privilege, previously held by the U.S. Em-
bassy, of maintaining close contact with Taiwanese economic offi-
cials. 74 However, it must be noted that "no private corporation has
ever received such a broad range of powers and authority to represent
the United States government as this act has given AIT." 75 For ex-
ample, the Taiwan Relations Act provides that the President may
grant certain diplomatic privileges and immunities to the CCNAA
when Taiwan grants comparable privileges and immunities to mem-
bers of the AIT. 76 Moreover, any conflict in law or regulation of
any political subdivision of the United States, in which the AIT is
71. Id. at 250-53. The Articles of Incorporation of the American Institute in Taiwan
are as follows:
The institute is organized to engage exclusively in charitable, educational, and
scientific activities, in furtherance of such activities (and without limitation):
(a) to enable the American people and the people on Taiwan to maintain com-
mercial, cultural, and other relations without official government representation or
diplomatic relations;
(b) to represent the interests of the United States and its people in conducting and
carrying out programs, transactions, and other relations with the people on Taiwan;
(c) to enable international agreements and arrangements to be performed and en-
forced in a manner consistent with subparagraphs (a) and (b) above; and
(d) to perform functions, on behalf of the American people, that would otherwise
be performed by government.
Id. at 251-52.
72. Randolph, supra note 70, at 260 n.40. Mr. Randolph notes that, "[u]nder the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, legally recognized 'international agreements'
may exist between states and 'other subjects of international law that are not states['], or
between such 'other subjects of international law' themselves." Id.
73. TRA Hearings, Oct. & Nov. 1979, supra note 43, at 37, 42 (statement of Hon-
orable Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State).
74. Oversight, supra note 65, at 32 (statement of William N. Morell, President of
the USA-ROC Economic Council); see also Comment, United States-Taiwan Rela-
tions: Taiwan Relations Act, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 731, 736 (1979) (the status of AIT is
virtually the same as that of an official U.S. consulate).
75. Comment, supra note 74, at 737-38 (footnote omitted).
76. The Taiwan Relations Act § 10(c), 22 U.S.C. § 3309(c) (Supp. V 1981).
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incorporated or doing business, which impedes the performance of
the AIT will be superceded by the Taiwan Relations Act."7 Finally,
the Act requires Congress to periodically report agreements concluded
through the AIT, review the AIT's performance and budget, and
review the legal and technical aspects of the U.S. -Taiwan relationship.7 1
V. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE AFTERMATH OF
DERECOGNITION
Since the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act, .the AIT has
enabled the United States and Taiwan to maintain political status quo
ante without jeopardizing Taiwan's legitimate security interests. It
is necessary, however, to consider the status of economic relations
between the two countries in light of the change in Taiwan's diplo-
matic status.
In the aftermath of the derecognition of Taiwan as the de jure
government of China, economic relations between the United States
and Taiwan have not deteriorated, but have improved. Thus, Taiwan
has been able to absorb the impact of U.S.-PRC normalization of
relations and confidently proceed through a smooth transition toward
unofficial relations with the United States. 79
It is argued that the Taiwanese are now able to proceed with
their economic plans because the uncertainty of Taiwan's future has
been removed by President Carter's shift in diplomatic recogni-
tion.80 The president of Ford Lio Ho Motor Company, a joint venture
firm that is 70 percent owned by Ford Motor Company, stated that
"[n]ormalization has removed the one dark cloud-whether Taiwan
could make it without the U.S."s'
77. Id. at § 6(c), 22 U.S.C. § 3305(c).
78. Id. at §§ 12, 14(a)(3), 22 U.S.C. §§ 3311, 3313(a)(3).
79. Oversight, supra note 65, at 32.
80. The U.S. rebuff fails to dampen the boom, supra note 26, at 51.
81. Id. In fact, two-way trade between the United States and Taiwan reached ap-
proximately $7.5 billion in 1978. Surprisingly, after derecognition in 1979, the trade volume
increased over 30 percent to approximately $10 billion. Another factor to this remarkable
increase in trade is the historical stability of Taiwan's economic system. From 1952 through
1977, Taiwan has enjoyed an annual growth rate of 8.4 percent, increasing its gross national
product 700 percent. In 1977, Taiwan gained real growth of 11.8 percent, increasing its
overall GNP to $15 billion and per capita income to $900.
Immediately after U.S. derecognition of the Taiwan government, wages in Taiwan rose
20 to 25 percent thereby countering inflation and the rise in consumer prices. Foreign
investment approvals were at their highest level during the first 11 months of 1979. During
1980, unemployment was less than 2 percent. These conditions, combined with the smooth
transition to unofficial relations, created much confidence that Taiwan could prosper as a
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A reason for Taiwan's strong economic performance has been
the establishment of joint venture agreements which involve high
technology transfers and the promotion of foreign investment. 82 This
has been due to Taiwan's expansion to capital-intensive and tech-
nology-intensive industries.83 This economic plan has had positive
effects on United States corporations since Taiwan has been able to
offer numerous tax incentives and investment opportunities to
them. Taiwan has expanded its gross national product (GNP) at an
annual average rate of over 10 percent since 1979.14
The Taiwanese experienced successful economic growth in 1979
by "redoubling their impressive drive to industrialize and to conquer
new world markets. . . compensating for the political shock of losing
their close political ties and military alliance with the U.S." 85 During
the first year of derecognition, several large joint venture agreements
involving high technology transfers and foreign investments were
signed with American firms such as General Electric and General
Motors.8 6 One major factor for this economic prosperity was Tai-
wan's revision of statutes which gave foreign investors considerably
separate political entity while absorbing the impact of normalization of relations between
the United States and the People's Republic of China. Finally, foreign private investment
in Taiwan during 1979 increased 64 percent over the previous year, amounting to approx-
imately $311 million. TRA Hearings, Oct. & Nov. 1979, supra note 43, at 2; see also
Taiwan: One Year After United States-China Normalization: Workshop Sponsored by the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, 71, 80 (1980) (state-
ments of Ralph Clough, George Washington University, and Jan Prybyla, Professor of Eco-
nomics, Pennsylvania State University) [hereinafter cited as One Year After]. See also
PRICE-WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN TAIwAN 8 (1979).
82. One Year After, supra note 81, at 80.
83. PRICE-WATERHOUSE, supra note 81, at 12. Some of the alternatives to promote
economic growth through a shift to capital-intensive and technology-intensive industries
include:
I. Allowing royalty payments for the technology to be exempt from taxes in Taiwan to
encourage local companies to purchase foreign technology:
2. Offering a number of additional incentives and tax benefits that are not currently available
to encourage well-known foreign companies to invest in Taiwan;
3. Permitting the purchase of locally listed stocks by foreign corporations and individuals
and allowing them the right to repatriate their investment and profits when the shares are
sold to promote the local securities market; and
4. Relaxing the controls and restrictions over the importation of goods and raw materials
so as to improve trade relations with other countries and simplify the customs release
procedures for imports and exports.
84. id. at 8.
85. The U.S. rebuff fails to dampen the boom, supra note 26. at 47.
86. Id. at 51. In the first eight months of 1979, U.S. companies invested $69 million
which nearly equalled the 1978 total of $70 million.
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more profit and tax incentives.
The Statute for Encouragement of Investment 87 by foreign na-
tionals provides liberal tax and other incentives to attract foreign
capital.88 The government of Taiwan has also indicated that it wel-
comes foreign investment if it falls into one of the following "en-
couraged" industry categories:
1. those productive and manufacturing endeavors needed in
Taiwan;
2. those enterprises with export markets;
3. those which improve and develop Taiwan's industry, min-
ing, and communications; and
4. those that promote economic and social development.
89
Finally, Taiwan offers foreign investors unlimited remittance of profits
and interest, repatriation of original capital and any subsequent ap-
proved additions at a rate of 20 percent annually commencing two
years after the completion of the approved investment plan. 9°
These tax incentives have encouraged major U.S. firms to enter
into joint venture agreements in the field of technology, research and
development. Firms like Chrysler, General Electric, Ford, General
Instruments, General Motors, Bechtel, Texas Instruments and RCA
have invested millions of dollars in Taiwan's market. 9' In fact, an-
87. Patrick, Marketing in Taiwan, in OVERSEAS Bus. REP. 21 (U.S. DEP'TOF COM.
1981).
88. These incentives include:
*Business income tax exemption for 5 years or accelerated depreciation of fixed
assets for newly established encouraged productive enterprises[;]
*Business income tax exemption for 4 years or accelerated depreciation of fixed
assets for encouraged productive enterprises at the time of increasing capital and
expanding machinery and equipment[;]
*Business income tax limited to 22 to 25 percent of total annual income[;]
*Export sales exempted from business tax[;]
*Special enouraged industries are exempted from import duty on imported ma-
chinery and equipment];]
*Productive enterprises may apply for installment payment of import duty on
imported machinery and equipment[;]
*Import duties paid or payable on imported raw materials used in export products
may be refunded or bonded[.1
Id.
89. Id. at 18. The investment policy in the past has drawn labor-intensive industries
but has now been modified in an effort to shift to more capital-intensive and high-technology
industries, including petrochemicals, steel, and shipbuilding. Id.
90. Id. at 20. A higher percentage rate would require special approval. Dividends
may be repatriated at any time, so long as the dividends declared do not exceed the profit
or accumulated profit per the tax return. Companies formed under the Statute are exempt
from the residence requirement normally applicable to shareholders and officers. Id. at 19.
91. One Year After, supra note 81, at 94, 96.
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alysts confidently predict that Taiwan will be the key manufacturer
of telecommunications by the mid-1980's. 92 For example, Interna-
tional Telephone and Telegraph entered into a joint venture agreement
with Taiwan's International Standard Electronics agreeing to produce
and market hardware and software equipment globally under Amer-
ican management but developed by the Taiwanese. 93 Most economic
analysts agree that Taiwan is a very attractive and profitable mar-
ket. It has withstood political setbacks and successfully challenged
the recent sluggishness in the world economy.
Nevertheless, U.S. investors should note that Taiwan's rate of
growth declined in 1982. Taiwan's GNP increased by 5 percent in
1981 but only rose to 3.6 percent in the first three quarters of 1982,
the lowest growth rate since 1973.94 This is far below the normal
average rate of growth of 9 percent per year. 95 Economists believe
that Taiwan's economy will make a moderate recovery of 4 to 6
percent growth rate in 1983.96 A main factor for the decline in rate
of growth can be attributed to the recession in and budget deficits of
the United States.
Taiwanese economic policymakers are striving to become less
dependent on the United States so that the economy will be less
vulnerable to fluctuations in the American economy. Despite these
efforts, however, exports to the United States increased by 19.6 per-
cent in 1980, 20.8 percent in 1981 and 8.5 percent in 1982. Taiwan's
exports to other trading partners decreased by 7.2 percent in 1982. 91 In
1982, U.S. exports to Taiwan totalled $4.4 billion and imports totalled
$8.9 billion, leaving a deficit of $4.5 billion. 98
There are several areas of trade which will enable U.S. companies
to reduce the current trade imbalance with Taiwan. These areas
92. Id. at 94. Despite the surge in high technology agreements between the U.S. and
Taiwanese firms, Taiwan's rate of economic growth during 1981 and the beginning of 1982
decreased. This was mainly due to the high interest rates, world-wide recession, increased
oil prices and the sluggish growth of its major trading partners. Nevertheless, Taiwan's
economy is still considered to be viable and impressive under international standards. See,
Even in the Midst of Slump Economy Posts Enviable Record; Exporters of High Technology
Items Find Ready Markets, Bus. AM., Mar. 8, 1982, at 26.
93. One Year After, supra note 81, at 91.
94. Opportunities Are Open to U.S. Firms in Certain Fields Despite Slumping Econ-
omies and Various Trade Barriers, Bus. AM., Apr. 4, 1983, at 29.
95. Id.
96. Id.




include: analytical and scientific instruments, computers, electronic
industry production and test equipment, electronic components and
medical equipment. 99 Imports of analytical and scientific instruments
are estimated to grow at approximately thirty percent through
1984. This is a result of increased sophistication of Taiwan's local
industries and their need for more advanced instrumentation. In ad-
dition, Taiwanese authorities are stressing research and development
in the private sector.l°°
Another growing market is the computer industry. The United
States currently dominates the Taiwan market mainly because their
software and service are highly reputable. There is extensive devel-
opment in Chinese-language word processing. ° Equipment for the
electronic industry should increase Taiwan's imports by 25 percent
through 1984 due to Taiwan's emphasis in high technology devel-
opment. Similarly, imports for electronic components are projected
to increase up to 35 percent as the United States maintains its standing
behind Japan in this area. 0 2 Finally, the United States will benefit
from a 30 percent growth in Taiwan's market of medical equipment
as several major hospitals plan significant expansion. 03
Despite these attractive markets for U.S. companies, several
factors will present obstacles to trade with Taiwan. First, the Taiwan
government will undergo protectionist measures beyond the already
existing high tariffs in response to the recession and pressure from
economic interest groups.'°4 The majority of tariffs have been con-
centrated in the agricultural sector. The American Institute in Taiwan
has attempted to liberalize this area of trade by entering into an
agreement with Taiwan's Coordination Council for North American
Affairs. The agreement, which took effect on July 12, 1982, lowered
duties on thirty-one U.S. agricultural and industrial products. 0 5
The second, and probably most significant, obstacle to U.S.-
Taiwan trade has been Taiwan's patent, trademark and copyright
infringements. '06 Examples of such infringements include a counter-








106. Fighting the Fakes From Taiwan, FORTUNE, May 30, 1983, at 114.
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penetrated markets in Asia, Africa and the Middle East under the
names of "Everlight" and "Evershine."' 07 Union Carbide's attor-
neys have acknowledged that people in Taiwan consider trademarks
"a Western system designed to stifle competition from local en-
trepreneurs."' 0 8 This is evidenced by Taiwanese law enforcement
officials' relatively lax treatment of counterfeiters. Although such
pirated products only accounted for less than 1 percent of Taiwan's
exports, the damage to American companies was very high.10 9 Taiwan
had to assure protection for foreign investors.
As a result, Taiwan has only recently enacted tougher legislation
to address the counterfeit problem. The new trademark law imposes
penalties of up to five years imprisonment."10 A ruling in March,
1983, also allowed Apple Computer to press criminal charges against
two companies that allegedly infringed on its design.' This has made
Taiwan courts more accessible because until the ruling, foreign com-
panies without registered local branches could not participate in crim-
inal actions.'' 2
Taiwan's cure for the counterfeit problem will be grad-
ual. Intellectual property rights present relatively new and vague
issues in Taiwan where most judges do not have such specialized
knowledge.1 13 American companies should register their trademarks
and patents in Taiwan and have U.S. Customs block any imports of
counterfeits. Apple Computer successfully convinced U.S. Customs
to stop counterfeit models named "Pineapple" and "Orange" from
entering the States." 4 While progress in adequate protection against
counterfeits has been gradual, investors may be assured that Taiwan




110. Id. Other actions taken by the Taiwan government include: strengthening the
existing Anti-Counterfeiting Committee by adding staff increasing the and budget and bring-
ing in law enforcement agencies; encouraging the judiciary to impose stiffer sentences;
disseminating information on convicted counterfeiters; studying the possibility of establishing
a special court; compiling information on well-known trademarks not registered in Taiwan;
and undertaking an educational campaign to discourage counterfeiting. Opportunities Are
Open to U.S. Firms in Certain Fields Despite Slumping Economies and Various Trade
Barriers, supra note 94, at 3 1.






Derecognition has not had negative effects on U.S.-Taiwan re-
lations for several reasons. First, the Taiwan Relations Act was en-
acted immediately after derecognition and provided continuity of all
relations while discouraging the PRC from imposing any block-
ade." 1 5 Second, the AIT has effectively conducted unofficial relations
with Taiwan and maintained close contact with American busi-
nesspersons in Taiwan." 6 Third, with few exceptions, the American
business community "gave no signs of allowing itself to be overly
influenced by the hypothetical . . . prospect of fabulously lucrative
business with the PRC, or to be intimidated by mainland threats
of boycotting American firms which conduct business with Taiwan
. .. .17 Fourth, Taiwan assured American businesspersons that de-
recognition would not adversely affect its attitude toward existing
U.S.-Taiwan commercial relations."l 8 Finally, derecognition oc-
cuffed at a "propitious time in the history of Taiwan's econ-
omy." 1 9 Based on the four years following derecognition, U.S.-
Taiwan relations have been positive and American businesspersons
may be optimistic about the Taiwan market.
VI. CONCLUSION
In light of the Taiwan Relations Act and principles of interna-
tional law, American business concerns and anxieties following de-
recognition were not jeopardized. President Carter and Congress
sought to alleviate these anxieties with quick legislation which assured
that commercial relations with Taiwan would remain unaffected by
U.S.-PRC normalization of relations.
The overall economic picture for U.S.-Taiwan commercial re-
lations remains optimistic. Taiwan's economy, however, is ex-
tremely vulnerable to extrinsic factors because it is heavily dependent
upon the American and Japanese economies. A deterioration in these
economies would have dramatic effects in Taiwan.' 20 Despite this
dependence, however, Taiwan has had an impressive economic record





120. Id. at 18, 80. Exports constitute 50 to 60 percent of Taiwan's GNP. Taiwan
imports almost all of its raw materials.
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measured by international standards. 12 '
The future of Taiwan's economic stability will also depend on
the country's military and political stability. The PRC has applied
increased pressure on the Reagan Administration to completely ter-
minate arms sales to Taiwan.' 22 Taiwan is quite concerned that this
may present another political setback initiated in reponse to PRC
pressure.'23 However, the Taiwan Relations Act permits the contin-
ued sales of defensive arms to Taiwan with the rationale that the
United States has strong security interests in Taiwan. 124
If arms sales to Taiwan were to significantly decrease this would
present a matter of grave concern to the Taiwanese government. The
possibility of PRC intervention in Taiwan's political or economic
affairs could possibly lead to serious domestic political up-
heaval. 25 To date, many congressional leaders have expressed con-
cern that the U.S. should provide assurance of Taiwan's security, and
that it pay sufficient attention to the military balance in East Asia
while considering the legitimate needs of Taiwan's defense. 126
However, Secretary of State George Shultz's recent trip to main-
land China signified the PRC's continued political pressure on the
United States to halt arms sales to Taiwan. The official Chinese news
agency, Xinhua, reported that two obstacles to improved Sino-U.S.
relations are the future of Taiwan and, more importantly- arms sales
to Taiwan. 127 Xinhua quoted Chinese leaders as saying that, "unless
this problem is resolved, mutual trust between China and the U.S. is
out of the question .... ,,128 PRC leaders have even urged that the
United States repeal the Taiwan Relations Act which mandates the
sale of defensive weapons to Taiwan.' 29
Although repeal of the Taiwan Relations Act is unlikely, Secretary
121. Id. at 82, 88-89. Economic analysts currently project that Taiwan's GNP will
reach $100 billion and per capita GNP will reach $6,000 with foreign trade almost equaling
$100 billion in the near future.
122. Trying to Snuff Out the Two-China Firecracker, Bus. WK., Apr. 26, 1982, at
56.
123. Id.
124. The Taiwan Relations Act §§ 2(b)(2), 2(b)(3), 2(b)(5), 22 U.S.C. § 3301 (Supp.
V 1981).
125. One Year After, supra note 81, at 23.
126. Id. at 135.
127. Ching, Schultz Trip Gets U.S., China Ties Off to New Start, Wall St. J., Feb.





of State Shultz affirmed U.S. intentions to abide by the provisions of
the U.S.-PRC joint communiqu6 of August 17, 1982, in which the
United States promised to gradually phase out arms sales to Tai-
wan. 30 Thus, "Taiwan's fear now is that its position will be eroded
step by step as Peking maintains its pressure on Washington." 3 The
United States must ensure that Taiwan maintains its self-confidence
through a strong defense and economy.
American investors must also consider the future of Taiwan's
political system. Although Taiwan's military security appears rela-
tively secure for the next five to seven years, 32 President Chiang
Ching-Kuo, who is now 73,133 is faced with increasing demands by
the native Taiwanese for more positions in government.34 Professor
Parris H. Chang observes that the mainlander elites who fled mainland
China to Taiwan are facing increased difficulties in maintaining their
dominance in political power as the Taiwanese press harder for greater
political participation. 135 The one-party system in Taiwan must
democratize to an extent that it allows -for more participation by the
native Taiwanese.
Should the political equilibrium in Taiwan experience severe
crisis, serious repercussions in the East Asian system and in U.S.-
PRC relations would develop. Assuming a worst-case scenario, the
lack of an appointed successor and a leadership crisis, once President
Chiang Ching-Kuo leaves office, would create mainlander-Taiwanese
tensions that may result in an effort by the native Taiwanese to assume
power and declare an independent republic of Taiwan. Such factional
infighting would bring an end to the minority government of the
mainlanders and probably provoke the PRC to attempt reunification
by military means. 136 Military intervention by the PRC would sig-
nificantly alter the balance of power in East Asia and leave the United
States with the difficult choice of defending Taiwan at the expense
of newly-developed relations with the PRC. Thus, serious internal
political turmoil in Taiwan would have a significant destabilizing
effect.
130. L.A. Times, Feb. 8, 1983, § 1, at 6, col. 1.
131. Id., Oct. 8, 1982, § I-B, at 1, col. 5.
132. One Year After, supra note 81, at 11-12, 149.
133. Id. at 9.
134. Id. at 12, 148-49.
135. Id. at 15 (prepared statement of Parris H. Chang, Professor of Political Science,
Pennsylvania State University).
136. Id. at 23.
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Though this scenario is unlikely, the American investor's efforts
to prevent destabilization should also continue to facilitate Taiwan's
access to American markets, credit, materials, technology and energy
resources. 3 7 American businesspersons should press the Reagan
Administration to guarantee the security of Taiwan, thereby protecting
U.S. security interests in East Asia. This requires a firm, consistent
policy toward the PRC and Taiwan which disallows any PRC coercion
to halt arms sales to Taiwan. Finally, Taiwan's own strength hinges
on its economic viability. The continuance of smooth U.S.-Taiwan
trade and commercial relations will assure such viability.*
Andrew M. Ling
137. Id.
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